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Association of
Nonfinancial
Performance Measures
with the Financial
Performance of a
Lodging Chain
by RAJIV D. BANKER, GORDON POTTER, and DHINU SRINIVASAN
A test of nonfinancial measures used as part of a
management-incentive program by a U.S.-based, full-
service hotel chain found that improvements in the
nonfinancial measures were followed shortly by
increases in revenue and profit. The two nonfinancial
measures are customer satisfaction as measured by
guests’ comment card indications of likelihood to
return and level of complaints. The lag between the
nonfinancial measures and changes in revenue and
operating profit was six months in this case. While the
test applies directly to that one chain, the lesson is
important to the rest of the hotel industry.
Keywords: nonfinancial performance measures; per-
formance evaluation; incentive plans;
customer satisfaction; executive com-
pensation; hospitality industry; balanced
score card.
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Many firms now use nonfinancialmeasures, such as product qual-ity, customer satisfaction, and
market share, to evaluate and reward man-
agerial performance.1 The primary rea-
sons suggested for this approach are that
these measures are better indicators of
future financial performance than are
accounting measures, and they are valu-
able in evaluating and motivating manage-
rial performance.2 To date, however, there
have been few independent studies of the
relationship between nonfinancial mea-
sures and financial performance. At that,
the results of existing studies have been
mixed.3 In addition, although there have
been calls for greater emphasis on nonfi-
nancial measures in internal performance-
measurement systems,4 and although
firms have implemented such systems, lit-
tle evidence exists regarding whether
including nonfinancial measures in per-
formance evaluation and incentive com-
pensation actually drives corporate suc-
cess.
5 We studied time-series data from a
number of lodging properties managed by
a large hospitality firm that implemented
an incentive system based on nonfinancial
and financial performance measures to
address the following two research ques-
tions: (1) Are the nonfinancial perfor-
mance measures leading indicators of
financial performance?6 and (2) Does the
adoption of an incentive compensation
plan that increases the emphasis on nonfi-
nancial performance measures for key
managers lead to improvements in both
financial and nonfinancial performance?7
Hospitality organizations were quick to
adopt the idea of monitoring and reporting
nonfinancial performance measures. For
instance, Huckestein and Duboff described
the implementation of a “balanced score-
card” at Hilton Hotels.8 Several reasons
have been suggested to explain why nonfi-
nancial measures are used by hospitality
firms to augment financial measures in
management control. For one thing, nonfi-
nancial measures are believed to comple-
ment short-run financial figures as indica-
tors of progress toward a firm’s long-term
goals and reflect overall corporate strat-
egy.9 Current profit and other financial
measures only partially reflect the effects
of past and current activities, whereas
nonfinancial measures of customer satis-
faction, internal process improvements,
and an organization’s innovation and
improvement activities reflect the effect of
current managerial actions that will not
show up in financial performance for some
time.10 The use of nonfinancial measures
for performance evaluation is also consis-
tent with theoretical work on compensa-
tion in agency settings. Because financial
measures of performance may be imper-
fect and noisy signals of a manager’s effort,
nonfinancial measures can add value by
inducing long-run, focused effort.11
The prevalence of compiling and
reporting nonfinancial metrics in the lodg-
ing industry suggests that hotel operating
companies may realize additional benefits
from tracking these measures. For
instance, hotel management companies
with large franchise operations are con-
cerned with the quality of their franchi-
sees’properties. Nonfinancial measures of
customer experiences at a franchised
property may provide information on how
certain properties improve or diminish the
franchisor’s overall reputation. Thus,
monitoring or contracting on the nonfi-
nancial measures of franchisees may help
resolve the free-rider problem. In addi-
tion, if nonfinancial measures reflect
future financial performance, they may be
useful for capital budgeting as they may
provide a clearer link between current new
investment and future cash flows.
Because several parties typically share
in a property’s cash flow, the relationships
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between nonfinancial measures, incentive
plans, and future financial performance
take on added significance. For instance, if
franchisors impose nonfinancial stan-
dards on their franchisees, owners need to
know that compliance with these mea-
sures is not going to result in a drop in
operating profits as they attempt to maxi-
mize nonfinancial measures. Moreover, as
management companies implement
incentive plans based in part on nonfinan-
cial measures, owners need to ascertain
whether these new plans, which they fund,
contribute to the owner’s long-term goal
of value creation. Otherwise, these types
of plans may simply result in wealth
transfers among the interested parties.
Using an event study design, we ana-
lyzed longitudinal archival data both
before and after a change in an incentive
plan to provide empirical evidence on the
financial effects of incorporating nonfi-
nancial measures in incentive contracts.
As we explain below, the analysis reveals
that nonfinancial measures of customer
perceptions are related to future financial
performance and that both financial and
nonfinancial performance improve fol-
lowing the implementation of an incentive
plan that includes nonfinancial measures
of performance.
Research Site, Incentive Plan,
and Data Collection
The research site for this study is a hotel
chain (which we call Hotelcorp) operated
by the hospitality division of a multi-
billion-dollar corporation. During the
period of this study, the chain franchised
more than two hundred hotels and directly
managed more than twenty hotels. The
hotels are located around the world, but
the focus of this study is the hotels that
Hotelcorp manages in the United States.
We studied the U.S. hotels so that we
could have access to senior managers and,
more important, for availability of com-
parative data for a control group of
franchised hotels and competitors that
enables us to estimate the relationship
between financial and nonfinancial per-
formance and isolate the performance
impact of the incentive plan.
The managed hotels vary from 150 to
450 rooms. Many of the hotels are rated as
four star, and all managed hotels offer full
service. Most of Hotelcorp’s managed
hotels cater largely to business travelers.
Many aspects of the managed hotels’
operations are homogeneous, notably
their incentive system, organizational
structure, clientele, and infrastructure.
Needless to say, exogenous factors like
geographic location and competitors are
different for each property.
Incentive Plan
Nearly two-thirds of hotel operators
use some form of incentive pay for their
managers, and more than one-half use
some kind of bonus program for their
hourly employees. The maximum bonus
ranges between 30 and 70 percent of the
base salaries for managers.12 Even though
a large percentage of the business in the
hotel industry is from repeat customers
and customer service is an essential
aspect, reliance on customer satisfaction
and related nonfinancial measures in
incentive pay is a recent phenomenon. A
survey conducted by Hotelcorp indicated
that in the 1990s other hotel chains had
implemented incentive programs for their
senior managers based on profit levels and
on nonfinancial measures, such as quality
of rooms and food, safety, guest satisfac-
tion, and employee satisfaction. The
incentive programs at major hotel chains
differed in target setting, bonus-pool cre-
ation, maximum bonus as a percentage of
salary, and weights placed on financial
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and nonfinancial performance measures,
but all of them emphasized nonfinancial
measures. The senior managers believed
that a customer-focused strategy is essen-
tial not only for the long-term profitability
of an individual hotel but also for enhanc-
ing the hotel chain’s brand value. Hotelcorp
introduced its incentive plan for key man-
agers with the objective of rewarding
employees for meeting the key objectives
of owners’ satisfaction (profitability) and
customer satisfaction, as outlined in its
mission statement.
Prior to the new incentive plan, individ-
ual hotel managers’ compensation
included a base salary and a bonus based
on financial measures, including operat-
ing profit, revenues, and costs. The maxi-
mum bonus was a percentage of the base
salary as determined by the manager’s
position at the property. For example, the
general manager of a hotel might earn up
to 20 percent of base pay as a bonus for
achieving the hotel’s profit goals. In addi-
tion, a portion of the bonuses of key man-
agers within a hotel was based on individ-
ual performance measures for their
particular area of responsibility. Although
customer-satisfaction measures were
tracked, they were not used explicitly for
incentive purposes. With the dual objec-
tives of keeping in line with competitors
and of focusing and directing the efforts of
managers on key company objectives, the
hotel chain’s new incentive plan was
based on both operating profit and nonfi-
nancial measures.
Based on the principles of the service-
profit chain,13 the new incentive plan was
developed by a team of regional vice pres-
idents and corporate executives represent-
ing human resources, marketing, plan-
ning, and operations. The team identified
both financial and nonfinancial measures
of performance based on the strategic
objective of satisfying the two stated con-
stituencies—namely, hotel owners and
guests. The new bonus plan for all hotel
managers can be approximated by a linear
contract based on hotel profit, proprietary
factors, and the following two nonfinancial
measures: likelihood of return and cus-
tomer complaints. The senior manager in
charge of the division indicated that the
weights on the financial and nonfinancial
measures were chosen based on a consen-
sus agreement among the senior managers.
Measurement of the variables and the
reasons for their inclusion in the incentive
plan are described later. Without disclos-
ing specific details, the basics of the new
plan are as follows. To begin with, manag-
ers’ base salaries did not change. The new
incentive plan differs from the old plan in
the following three ways: (1) the new plan
relies on performance measures (both
financial and nonfinancial) common to all
managers, while the old plan relied on
individual performance measures (mainly
financial); (2) the new plan explicitly
incorporates nonfinancial measures with
specific weights on each measure; and (3)
the new plan increases the maximum pos-
sible bonus for some managers by increas-
ing the bonus rate applied to the base sal-
ary, with a large proportion of that
potential bonus based on nonfinancial
measures. However, the new incentive
plan continues to use current gross operat-
ing profit (GOP) as the financial perfor-
mance measure and provides the same (or
slightly lower) level of incentives for
achieving operating profit goals as the old
plan.14 Managers could earn the maximum
possible bonus only if both financial and
nonfinancial targets are attained. In sum-
mary, the new incentive plan retained the
company’s existing emphasis on current
financial performance but also encouraged
attainment of nonfinancial objectives.
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Data
Monthly data were obtained for a
period of up to seventy-two months for the
managed hotels. Company documents and
interviews with senior managers and cor-
porate staff provided qualitative data on
their beliefs and expectations about the
incentive plan. In addition, general man-
agers of two hotels were interviewed to
understand hotel operations and obtain
their views about effort reallocation in
response to the new incentive plan. We
examined the following nonfinancial
performance measures.
Likelihood of return (LRETURN). Cus-
tomer satisfaction is considered a key
short-term measure that is a lead indicator
of long-term performance. In evaluating
customer satisfaction, many hotels
employ a weighted index of customer sat-
isfaction based on a number of questions.
The incentive plan at Hotelcorp uses a
measure based only on the response to the
comment card question that asks how
likely it is that a guest will return.15 Senior
managers believe that this question best
captures the customers’ intent to provide
repeat business. LRETURN is computed
as the percentage of customer-response
cards with the two highest ratings (that is,
4 or 5 out of 5). Hotel managers can take a
number of actions pertaining to the opera-
tions of the hotel to improve this measure,
including price concessions and deliver-
ing amenities to the rooms. However, such
extra steps may lead to an increase in oper-
ating costs that could penalize their
financial scores.
Customer complaints (COMPLNTS).
The number of customer complaints is
another measure used in the plan. Billing
errors, service catastrophes, and problems
with service personnel are some of the
prime reasons for customers to switch
hotels.16 Analogous to defect rates in a
manufacturing setting, customer com-
plaints provide direct feedback on the
hotel’s operating processes and are useful
for developing corrective actions. Thus,
customer complaints can also be viewed
as an internal business-process measure
that reflects the effectiveness of the opera-
tions at a hotel.17 Focusing on potential
problem areas, responding quickly to
complaints, and resolving customer con-
cerns are examples of managerial actions
that can reduce the number of complaints
and impact customer loyal ty. 1 8
COMPLNTS is measured as the number
of customer complaints per thousand
room-nights. Hotelcorp included this
measure also because it provides an inde-
pendent measure of customer satisfaction.
Customers register their complaints either
by calling the customer service center
directly or by writing. Thus, this measure
cannot be manipulated easily. The cross-
sectional correlation between LRETURN
and COMPLNTS ranged between –.27
and –.39 over the seventy-two-month
sample period.
Financial Performance Measures
As we said above, GOP is the financial-
performance measure employed in
Hotelcorp’s incentive plan. For our pur-
poses, gross operating profit per available
room (GOPPAR) is computed as total rev-
enue per available room (TREVPAR)
from rooms, food, beverage, and other
activities like telephone and movies, less
departmental and undistributed operating
expenses per available room (COSTPAR).
The use of this measure of GOP reflects
Hotelcorp’s philosophy that “measure-
ments must reflect the manager’s effec-
tiveness.” Financial data follow the uni-
form system of accounts for the hotel
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industry.19 We partitioned TREVPAR into
its price and occupancy components, aver-
age daily rate, and occupancy. Average
rate (AVGRATE) was measured as total
(not room) revenues divided by the num-
ber of occupied rooms, and occupancy
rate (OCCRATE) was measured as the
number of occupied rooms divided by the
number of available rooms.
Results
Descriptive Information
Exhibit 1 summarizes the definitions of
the variables, while Exhibit 2 presents dis-
guised information on the study’s key
variables. Average daily TREVPAR is
$86.96, and the corresponding cost is
$66.50. Revenue can be partitioned into
the average amount per room occupied,
$126.20, with an occupancy rate of 69 per-
cent. Over the study period, 91 percent of
respondents said they were likely to return
to the hotel if they again visited the area
(LRETURN). Customer complaints
(COMPLNTS) averaged 0.92 per
thousand rooms occupied.
Estimation Models
Nonfinancial Measures as Lead Indicators
of Financial Performance
We use pooled time-series data of up to
sixty months for eighteen properties to
examine the relationship between current
nonfinancial performance measures and
future financial measures. Our estimation
models specify financial performance per
NOVEMBER 2005 Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 399
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Exhibit 1:
Description of Variables
TREVPAR Total revenue per available room
COSTPAR Operating cost per available room
AVGRATE Average rate for a hotel measured as total revenues divided by
number of occupied rooms
OCCRATE Occupancy rate for a hotel measured as number of occupied
rooms divided by number of available rooms
LRETURN Likelihood of return measure
COMPLNTS Number of complaints per thousand rooms
Exhibit 2:
Descriptive Statistics
Standard First Third
Variable Mean Deviation Quartile Median Quartile
TREVPAR 86.96 25.56 68.41 86.26 103.89
COSTPAR 66.50 16.55 56.24 65.88 76.03
AVGRATE 126.20 27.01 111.19 126.71 143.30
OCCRATE 0.69 0.15 0.60 0.71 0.80
LRETURN 0.91 0.08 0.88 0.93 0.96
COMPLNTS 0.92 0.65 0.45 0.80 1.22
Note: All numbers are disguised by multiplying by a scalar. See Exhibit 1 for definitions of variables.
available room and its components as
functions of exogenous parameters, past
financial performance, and lagged values
of nonfinancial measures.20 The exoge-
nous variables that affect financial perfor-
mance in the hotel industry include hotel-
specific factors; seasonality; and local,
regional, and other economy-wide factors
like inflation. To control for exogenous
factors that affect revenues, we include an
index (labeled COMPREV) that measures
competitors’ average revenue per avail-
able room (RevPAR). This measure
(COMPREV) is the most widely used
benchmark in the hotel industry and best
captures the external variables that affect
the local hotel industry. COMPREV is
computed by an independent agency that
collects the relevant confidential informa-
tion from participating hotels.
Unlike the revenue model, competitors’
cost data, which may help the model to
control for seasonality and other factors,
are not available. Since hotels’ seasonal
and trend variations in operating costs are
primarily driven by volume, we include
occupancy rate (OCCRATE) to control for
variations in operating costs. To control
for changes in operating costs due to infla-
tion, we include the Employment Cost
Index (ECI), which measures the average
total wages and benefits paid to employ-
ees, since payroll costs can constitute
more than half of operating costs. Because
of the lack of competitor data, for the
GOPPAR model we control for seasonal
and other variations by including
COMPREV as a control variable. We also
include the previous period’s financial
performance to control for hotel-specific
time trends and to examine whether nonfi-
nancial measures provide additional
information on future financial perfor-
mance that is not reflected in current
financial measures.21
While earlier studies recognize that
nonfinancial measures may have long-
term effects, no formal theory identifies
the specific number of lags for nonfinan-
cial measures. Anderson, Fornell, and
Lehmann use a half-year-lag model, for
example, but they do not present a theoret-
ical justification for using that length of
time.22 Therefore, it is necessary to under-
take a specification search to determine
the appropriate lag length. The results of
that search are AVGLRETURN and
AVGCOMPLNTS. These two variables,
which are the moving average of the past
six months of the nonfinancial measures,
are included as independent variables
rather than multiple lags.23 Consequently,
for this firm changes in nonfinancial mea-
sures affect the next six months of finan-
cial performance.
Exhibits 3 through 6 present estimates
of the relationships between nonfinancial
measures and future financial perfor-
mance as measured by the levels of reve-
nues, operating cost, and profit per avail-
able room. The overall regressions are
significant (p = .01) with adjusted R2 rang-
ing from .80 to .90. The two nonfinancial
measures in these regressions have incre-
mental R2 ranging from .005 to .025 and
account for 5 to 25 percent of the unex-
plained variance in financial performance.
Exhibit 3 reveals that the prior-six-month
average of LRETURN is positively asso-
ciated with TREVPAR and GOPPAR. (It
is also significant, p < .01.) The exhibit
reports that a 0.10 increase in LRETURN
would result in about a $2.75 increase in
TREVPAR per day and about a $1.64
increase in GOPPAR per day. While costs
also increase, $0.53, the amount is not sig-
nificantly different than zero. Exhibit 4
reveals that most of the gain in revenue is
explained by increases in occupancy,
rather than from ADR rises. Indeed, a 0.10
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increase in LRETURN is estimated to
result in an increase in occupancy of 3.7
percent.
Exhibit 5 reveals that COMPLNTS is
negatively associated with revenues and
profit per available room (but it is not sig-
nificantly so at p < .01). The exhibit
reports that a 1.0 decrease in COMPLNTS
would result in about a $1.00 increase in
TREVPAR per day and about a $0.40
increase in operating profit per room per
day. While costs also increase, about
$0.70, the amount is not different from
zero. In this case, most of the gain is
explained by increases in average revenue
per room sold (as shown in Exhibit 6). In
fact, a 1.0 decrease in COMPLNTS is esti-
mated to result in significant increase in
daily revenue per room sold of more than
$3.00.
In summary, the results suggest that the
nonfinancial measures used by Hotelcorp
are lead indicators of future financial per-
formance. The analyses of the lead-lag
relationship between Hotelcorp’s nonfi-
nancial performance measures and its
financial performance suggest that nonfi-
nancial measures of customer satisfaction
help predict future financial performance
for the next six months. Our results also
suggest that the association between
financial and nonfinancial performance
may be a result of repeat purchases rather
than increased price premiums. This find-
ing is similar to that of Ittner and Larcker,
who reported that customer-satisfaction
NOVEMBER 2005 Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 401
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TREVPAR COSTPAR GOPPAR
$ Change in TREVPAR
$ Change in Cost per Available
Room
 $ Change in Profit per
Available Room
Exhibit 3:
Association of a 0.1 Increase in Likelihood of Return with Financial Performance
(per Available Room) (Holding All Other Variables Constant)
Note: See Exhibit 1 for definitions of variables.
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$ Change in AVGRATE
Exhibit 4:
Association of a 0.1 Increase in Likelihood of Return with Rate and Occupancy
(Holding All Other Variables Constant)
Note: See Exhibit 1 for definitions of variables.
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$ Change in TREVPAR
$ Change in Cost per Available
Room
 $ Change in Profit per
Available Room
Exhibit 5:
Association of a 1.0 Decrease in Customer Complaints with Financial Performance
(Holding All Other Variables Constant)
Note: See Exhibit 1 for definitions of variables.
measures are associated with growth in
new customers but not with increased
profit from existing customers.24 More-
over, we find little evidence that increased
customer satisfaction is associated with
increased operating costs other than
through the impact on occupancy-related
variable costs.
Impact of Incentive Plan on Nonfinancial
Performance
Our second research question focuses
on the performance effects of including
nonfinancial measures in incentive plans.
Intuitively, one would expect a perfor-
mance measure to improve when it is posi-
tively linked to monetary incentives.
Agency theoretic research supports the
view that including a performance mea-
sure in an incentive plan results in a reallo-
cation of effort by managers that leads to
an improvement along the measured
dimension.25 As discussed earlier, nonfi-
nancial measures were reported at
Hotelcorp but not used for incentive pur-
poses prior to the implementation of the
new plan.
As shown in Exhibit 7, the implementa-
tion of the incentive plan can affect financial
performance either indirectly by improv-
ing nonfinancial performance measures,
which then affect financial performance,
or directly through enhanced cost effi-
ciency or value-added activities. Imple-
mentation of an incentive plan based on
customer-satisfaction-oriented nonfinan-
cial measures increases customer-service
activities and, consequently, installing
such a plan is likely to increase customer
satisfaction. An increase in operating
costs may also result from an increased
customer-satisfaction effort. For example,
managers may have to train their employ-
ees in customer service. While it is possi-
ble that costs may increase, we expect that
NOVEMBER 2005 Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 403
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$ Change in AVGRATE
Exhibit 6:
Association of a 1.0 Decrease in Customer Complaints with Rate and Occupancy
(Holding All Other Variables Constant)
Note: See Exhibit 1 for definitions of variables.
any cost increase would be lower than the
corresponding revenue increase, meaning
that profits are expected to increase as a
consequence of an increased emphasis on
customer satisfaction. Finally, the new
incentive plan provides higher bonus
potential for some managers, and bonus
costs are likely to increase following the
implementation of the plan. Therefore,
operating costs (both inclusive and exclu-
sive of bonus costs) are likely to increase
following the implementation of the new
incentive plan.
Estimates of the effects of the change in
the incentive plan on nonfinancial mea-
sures are presented in Exhibit 8.26 The
exhibit reveals that nonfinancial perfor-
mance improved following the plan’s
implementation. The exhibit reports that
LRETURN increased a small but statisti-
cally significant 0.01 due to the plan. This
suggests that the incentive plan resulted in
an increase in customer satisfaction as
measured by the likelihood-of-return
measure. The exhibit also reveals that
COMPLNTS dropped a significant 0.09,
also presumably as a result of the incentive
plan. Overall, these results support the
assertion that “what you measure is what
you get.”27
Impact of Incentive Plan on Financial
Performance
Exhibit 9 presents the incentive plan’s
estimated effect on the three measures of
financial performance (all statistically sig-
nificant).28 Estimates from the revenue
model suggest that the plan resulted in a
TREVPAR increase of about $1.56. This
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Direct Impact of the Incentive Plan
+
+
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COSTS
PROFITPlan
Exhibit 7:
Relation between Incentive Plan, Nonfinancial Measures, and Financial
Performance
Note: See Exhibit 1 for definitions of variables.
result is consistent with the earlier results
that the nonfinancial measures are posi-
tively associated with revenues and that
these measures improved following the
change in the incentive plan. Overall, the
results indicate that the incentive plan
change has a positive and significant effect
on revenues, controlling for inflation and
competitors’ performance. Exhibit 10
reveals that revenue gains came through
both rate and occupancy increases. At the
same time, the plan also resulted in a
decrease in operating costs of about $1.12
per room per night, after controlling for
changes in costs due to changes in occu-
pancy. Contrary to our expectations, this
result indicates that hotel managers did
not stifle cost-reduction efforts or increase
spending to improve customer satisfac-
tion. The impact of incentive plan change
on GOPPAR is estimated at about $1.00
per available room. Following the incen-
tive plan change, revenues increased and
costs decreased significantly, resulting in
a net profit increase.
Overall, these results suggest that both
nonfinancial and financial performance
improved following the implementation
of the incentive plan that included nonfi-
nancial performance measures. While it is
tempting to attribute this improvement
solely to the fact that nonfinancial mea-
sures were added to the incentive compen-
sation plan, caution needs to be exercised
in drawing that inference because of the
nature of the incentive-plan implementa-
tion. Therefore, the improvement in finan-
cial performance cannot be entirely
ascribed to the inclusion of nonfinancial
measures.
Impact of Incentive Plan on the Hotel Chain’s
Performance
Marketing literature suggests that there
may be positive externalities for improve-
ments in customer satisfaction. Typical of
most hotel chains, much of Hotelcorp’s
revenues come from franchise and man-
agement fees. As hotel manager, Hotelcorp
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0
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LRETURN COMPLNTS
Change in LRETURN
Change in COMPLNTS
Exhibit 8:
Association of Incentive Plan with Nonfinancial Performance Measures
Note: See Exhibit 1 for definitions of variables.
collects a flat fee, plus incentive fees based
on either revenues or profits of individual
hotels. The emphasis on customer satis-
faction can lead to improved overall
brand-name reputation and increased
profitability for the whole chain. Based on
better brand-name reputation, Hotelcorp
may be able to increase the number of
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Note: See Exhibit 1 for definitions of variables.
franchised hotels, thereby increasing its
profits through franchise fees. Over the
seven-year period preceding our study, the
number of franchised hotels nearly dou-
bled, and total revenues (without inflation
adjustment) more than tripled.
Exhibit 11 shows the incentive plan’s
effect on the hotel chain as a whole. For
this analysis, we examined the growth in
the available number of rooms under the
Hotelcorp brand name after controlling
for the overall industry growth as mea-
sured by the number of rooms added in a
year by the upscale and midscale hotel
chains in the United States. In addition, we
examined the growth in annual revenues
generated by all Hotelcorp hotels relative
to annual revenues generated by the
upscale and midscale hotel chains in the
United States. As shown in Exhibit 11,
both the number of franchised hotels and
the total revenues increased more for
Hotelcorp than for its competitors follow-
ing the implementation of its new incen-
tive plan. This finding provides one more
rationale for the use of customer-satisfac-
tion measures in hotel-performance evalu-
ation. Once again, we must warn that the
results should be viewed with caution
because of externalities that we did not
measure. Changes in franchise-fee struc-
tures, market niche, promotional efforts,
contractual obligations, and other macro-
economic factors may have influenced the
chain’s growth in franchised hotels and
revenues.
Concluding Remarks
Despite the cautions we have urged in
interpreting our findings, the fact remains
that we have documented that the nonfi-
nancial measures used in the Hotelcorp’s
incentive plan were significantly associ-
ated with the chain’s subsequent financial
performance as measured by individual
business unit revenues and operating
profit. Moreover, our analysis provided
some qualified support for the argument
that these customer-satisfaction measures
are associated more with long-term profits
than with immediate financial perfor-
mance. In addition, these simple measures
of customer satisfaction were more effec-
tive than a complex measure in predicting
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financial performance. Our analysis also
documented that nonfinancial performance
improved following the implementation
of the incentive plan that included nonfi-
nancial measures. Financial performance,
as measured by GOP, also improved.
There are several limitations to this
study. To begin with, we studied just one
chain. However, if Hotelcorp is represen-
tative of other hotel chains, our findings
may be generalized to the hospitality
industry, albeit with the cautions we have
offered above. Our analysis indicates that
there is an average lag of six months
between the time of a customer-satisfaction
measurement and the resulting financial
performance. The relatively short lag
between measured satisfaction and a
hotel’s financial results is similar to that of
retail banking and seems to capture the
economic consequences of customers’
frequent visits.29 Another limitation per-
tains to data availability. The absence of
full data for a carefully designed control
group necessitates caution in interpreting
the results. The study relies on alternative
control measures in the form of compara-
tive data for competitors or franchised
hotels, but such comparable measures
were not available for some models. Our
findings are also limited by our model
specification in the absence of a theoreti-
cal functional relation between nonfinan-
cial measures and financial performance.
Finally, because the incentive plan capped
the bonus payouts as a percentage of oper-
ating profit, the incentive plan was able to
cover its expenses and produce a net profit,
and, hence, we conclude that it had a posi-
tive impact on profitability. Nevertheless,
we are unable to provide a measure of
overall ROI for the incentive plan because
the potential positive externalities of non-
financial measures on systemwide perfor-
mance improvements and the costs of
incentive plan design and implementation
need to be quantified in a more rigorous
way. We leave it for future research to
address this.
We conclude with some practical
implications. Before beginning, it is
important to keep in mind that at no time
did Hotelcorp consider its plan based on
nonfinancial measures to be optimal, and
the firm has likely made refinements since
our study. Acknowledging this, one impli-
cation of the study is that even simple
measures of nonfinancial performance,
such as likelihood of return and number of
complaints, are related to future financial
performance and appear to induce some
appropriate managerial actions. Thus,
firms may not need to invest in complex
survey sources and expensive information-
gathering techniques to implement an
effective performance measurement sys-
tem. Another implication is that it is
important for hotel management to docu-
ment the relationships between various
nonfinancial measures and financial per-
formance. At our research site, top man-
agement had an idea about this relation-
ship but did not have any quantifiable
method to convince individual hotels. Nor
did the company have clear guidelines on
how improvement in these measures could
be attained. Understanding the links
should help operating companies obtain
the necessary support of employees, own-
ers, and franchisees. It will also help pub-
lic enterprises in complying with the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s
recent ruling that management’s discus-
sion and analysis should identify and dis-
cuss key performance metrics, including
nonfinancial performance measures that
are material and used to manage the busi-
ness.
30 Such an analysis will also help
determine the appropriate measures and
weights to be placed on these measures.
For example, quantifying the relation-
ships between nonfinancial measures and
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financial performance across a wide range
of observations could help in setting tar-
gets for nonfinancial measures. More is
not always better; in fact, it may hurt over-
all performance beyond some threshold.
Third, it is important for top management
to identify other organizational factors
such as culture and top managerial attitude
toward customer satisfaction that may
enhance or impede the success of incen-
tive plans. While our study has docu-
mented an average effect across the eigh-
teen properties, individual properties
could exhibit varying levels of effective-
ness. A more detailed comparative study
of individual hotels will be of help in iden-
tifying such contextual factors.
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